

Syllabus

Introduction to International Organizations

Summer semester 2018

Wednesdays, 8.00am – 10.00am, Scharnhorststr. 100 - SCH 100.301

Institute of Political Science, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster

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Course description:

This course is an intermediate-level course in international relations which will focus on the role of international organizations (IOs) in world politics. Its main focus will be on the problems of cooperation in the international system and how international institutions are used, with varying degrees of success, to overcome these problems. Particular emphasis will be placed on students' ability to think critically, both about the nature of problems that face states as well as development of global governance mechanisms.

While international non-governmental organizations will make an appearance, our focus will be on intergovernmental organizations. We will examine their historical origins, design, functions, the international and domestic political forces that impact their operations, and their effectiveness.

In order to have a core set of analytical tools we can apply to our study of specific IOs, we will begin the course with a critical consideration of the challenge of cooperation under anarchy and IR scholars' responses. From a theoretical perspective, we will consider various approaches, such as realist, liberal, constructivist, and institutionalist/bureaucratic arguments, as well as theories of marginalization.

Delving into specific IOs, we begin with a historic perspective on the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations. We spend some time on the institutional design and functioning of the UN and its main organs, before moving on to regional organizations such as the European Union and the Organization of American States. Next, we consider how particular global issues are addressed by intergovernmental institutions. We look at collective security (NATO), human rights protection (UNHRC, European and Interamerican Courts of Human Rights), peacekeeping and criminal justice (UN Blue Helmets and ICC), trade and development (World Bank, IMF, WTO), and the environment (UNEP and UNFCCC). We end the semester by reflecting on the future of IOs and their capacity to solve global problems.

Course aims and learning objectives:

The goal of this course is that students develop a theoretical as well as practical understanding of international organizations (IOs) and the global problems they attempt to address. Upon completion of the course, students should be able to articulate the leading explanations within political science for why IOs exist, controversies surrounding IOs in the context of international relations theory, why they are thought to help solve global problems, and the major challenges IOs face in meeting their objectives. Students should also be able to apply theoretical arguments from the IR literature to several specific cases.

Assessment overview:

- Course work: Complete required readings and participate actively during class.
- Studienleistung: In order to understand how international cooperation can contribute to solving real-world problems, we will organize a one-lecture simulation of post-conflict peace building and creating accountability for human rights violations. Each class participant will be assigned a role at the beginning of the semester. In this context, your Studienleistung will consist of the following:
 - A 3-page policy brief, handed in two days prior to our simulation (**04.06.18**), detailing the following:
 - 1 page: Background on your person, who you represent, and what your stake (interest) is during these meetings. You will receive some preliminary information, but the simulation is based on real-life characters, so feel free to do some historical research!
 - 1 page: Detail how your character sees the potential contribution of international cooperation or IOs in advancing his/her interest. Who can be won as an ally? Which institutional precedent exists that may inspire a possible solution? (P.S. your character might feel strongly that IOs have no role to play in the solution of this problem. If that is the case - why not? What precedent exists where IOs did not advance the best interests of similar groups?)
 - 1 page: Draft an opening statement or an overview of your policy priorities during the negotiations. Every person will be asked to make a substantive contribution during the simulation. This last page will be your guidance in this process. If you prefer more preparation, you can draft a statement in advance; if you prefer to be spontaneous, it could be a list of policy priorities or preferred negotiation outcomes you can refer to during the talks.
 - Your active participation during the simulation.
- The Prüfungsleistung will consist of a final exam (Klausur) on **11.07.18** during class time (8.00am-10.00am). You will receive a sample structure of the exam beforehand. All material covered in class and in the required readings may be tested in the final exam.

Part I: Introduction and theoretical underpinnings

Lecture 1: Introduction – Why do we need international organizations? (11.04.18)

Required reading (REQ): Syllabus of this class!

Further reading:

Axelrod, R. and Keohane, R.O. (1985). Achieving cooperation under anarchy: Strategies and institutions. *World Politics*, 38(1), pp.226-254.

Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. *World Politics*, 30(2), pp.167-214.

Lecture 2: Theoretical approaches to international organization(s) (18.04.18)

REQ: Abbott, K.W. and Snidal, D. (1998). Why states act through formal international organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(1), pp.3-32.

Further reading:

Barnett, M.N. and Finnemore, M. (1999). The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations. *International Organization*, 53(4), pp.699-732.

Keohane, R.O. (1982). The demand for international regimes. *International Organization*, 36(2), pp.325-355.

Keohane, R.O. (1998). International institutions: Can interdependence work?. *Foreign Policy*, pp.82-194.

Koremenos, B., Lipson, C. and Snidal, D. (2001). The rational design of international institutions. *International Organization*, 55(4), pp.761-799.

Mearsheimer, J.J. (1994). The false promise of international institutions. *International Security*, 19(3), pp.5-49.

Thompson, A. and Snidal, D. (1999). International organization. *Encyclopedia of Law and Economics*, University of Ghent.

Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. *International Organization*, 46(2), pp.391-425.

Part II: Global and regional governance: The United Nations and regional IGOs

Lecture 3: The League of Nations and the emergence and functioning of the United Nations (25.04.18)

Note: This week (and others) there are two required readings! Do both!

REQ 1: The Charter of the United Nations

REQ 2: Johnstone, I. (2003). The role of the UN secretary-general: The power of persuasion based on law. *Global Governance* 9(4), pp. 441-458.

Further reading:

Claude, I.L. (1966). Collective legitimization as a political function of the United Nations. *International Organization*, 20(3), pp.367-379.

Kuziemko, I. and Werker, E. (2006). How much is a seat on the Security Council worth? Foreign aid and bribery at the United Nations. *Journal of Political Economy*, 114(5), pp.905-930.

O'Neill, B. (1996). Power and satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40(2): pp. 219-237.

Lecture 4: Deterrence, collective security, and NATO (02.05.18)

REQ 1: Mearsheimer, J.J. (1994). The false promise of international institutions. *International Security* 19(3): pp.5-49.

REQ 2: Kupchan, C. and Kupchan, C. (1995). The promise of collective security. *International Security* 20(1): pp. 52-61.

Further reading:

Art, R. (1998). Creating a disaster: NATO's open door policy. *Political Science Quarterly* 113(3): pp. 383-403.

Miller, L.H. (1999). The idea and the reality of collective security. *Global Governance* 5(3): pp. 303-332.

Reiter, D. (2001). Why NATO enlargement does not spread democracy. *International Security*. 25(4): pp. 41-67.

Wallander, C. (2000). Institutional assets and adaptability: NATO after the Cold War. *International Organization*. 54(4): pp. 705-735.

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Lecture 5: Regional IGOs: Focus on the European Union (EU), Organization of American States (OAS), and League of Arab States (Arab League) (09.05.18)

REQ: Pollack, M. A. (1997). Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community. *International Organization* 51(1): pp. 99-134.

Further reading:

Boniface, D. S. (2002). Is there a democratic norm in the Americas - an analysis of the Organization of American States. *Global Governance* 8: p. 365.

Haas, E.B. (1961). International integration: The European and the universal process, *International Organization* 15(3): pp. 366-392.

Mohamedou, M. M. O. (2016). Arab agency and the UN project: the League of Arab States between universality and regionalism. *Third World Quarterly* 37(7): pp. 1219-1233.

Moravcsik, A. (1991). Negotiating the Single European Act: National interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community. *International Organization* 45(1): pp. 19-56.

Victoria, I. A. B. (2015). Back to politics: lessons from the crisis of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. *Buffalo Human Rights Law Review* 22: pp. 21-66.

Part III: IOs, human rights protection and peacekeeping

Lecture 6: Human rights protection through treaties and legal action (UNHRC, ECHR, IACtHR, ICC) (16.05.18)

REQ: Hafner-Burton, E.M. (2012). International regimes for human rights. *Annual Review of Political Science* 15: pp. 265-286.

Further reading:

Hathaway, O. (2002). Do human rights treaties make a difference? *Yale Law Journal* 111(8): pp. 1935-2042.

Helfer, L.R. (1999). Forum shopping for human rights. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 148(2): pp. 285-301.

Kelley, J. (2007). Who keeps international commitments and why? The International Criminal Court and bilateral nonsurrender agreements, *American Political Science Review*, 101(3): pp. 573-589.

Lebovic, J. and Voeten, E. (2006). The politics of shame: The condemnation of country human Rights practices in the UNHRC. *International Studies Quarterly* 50(4): pp. 861-888.

Moravcsik, A. (2000). The origins of human rights regimes: Democratic delegation in postwar Europe. *International Organization* 54(2): pp. 217-52.

Neumayer, Eric. (2005). Do international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights?. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(6): pp. 925-53.

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University of California TV's "The International Criminal Court and Opposition to the Court" <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HY84gfC4cfQ&feature=relmfu>

-----Spring Break/Pfingstferien-----

Lecture 7: Peacekeeping and humanitarian action (30.05.18)

REQ: Doyle, M. W., & Suntharalingam, N. (1994). The UN in Cambodia: lessons for complex peacekeeping. *International Peacekeeping*, 1(2), 117-147.

Further reading:

Akashi, Y. (1994). The challenge of peacekeeping in Cambodia. *International Peacekeeping*, 1(2), 204-215.

Diehl, P. F., & PharaohKhan, E. (2000). Financing UN peacekeeping: A review and assessment of proposals. *Review of Policy Research*, 17(1): pp. 71-104.

Fortna, V.P. (2004). Does peacekeeping keep peace?: International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war. *International Studies Quarterly*, 48: pp. 269-292

Jackson, R. (2004). International engagement in war-torn countries. *Global Governance*, 10(1): pp. 21-36.

Krain, M. (2005). International intervention and the severity of genocides and politicides. *International Studies Quarterly*, 49(3): pp. 363-387.

Power, S. (2008). *Chasing the flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the fight to save the world*. New York: Penguin.

04.06.18: Due date policy brief!

Lecture 8: Simulation on the Cambodia Peace Settlement (06.06.18)

Part IV: IOs, trade, development and the environment

Lecture 9: The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (13.06.18)

REQ: Brown, B. (2001). IMF governance, the Asian financial crisis and the new international financial architecture. *International Law in the Post-Cold War World. Essays in Memory of Li Haopei*.

REQ: McGregor, S. (2005). Structural adjustment programmes and human well-being. *International Journal of Consumer Studies*, 29(3), 170-180.

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Further reading:

Nielson, D. and Tierney, M. (2003). Delegation to international organizations: Agency theory and World Bank reform. *International Organization* 57(2): pp. 241-276.

Simmons, B.A. (2000). The legalization of international monetary affairs. *International Organization* 54(3): pp. 573-602.

Woods, N. (2010). Global governance after the financial crisis: a new multilateralism or the last gasp of the great powers?. *Global Policy* 1(1): pp. 51-63.

Lecture 10: The World Trade Organization and regional trade agreements (20.06.18)

REQ: Steinberg, R.H. (2002). In the shadow of law or power? Consensus-based bargaining and outcomes in the GATT/WTO. *International Organization* 56(2): pp. 339-74.

Further reading:

Adam, E. (2004). The WTO and the crisis of multilateralism: A look at the present situation. *FES Briefing Paper October 2004*.

Busch, M. (2007). Overlapping institutions, forum shopping, and dispute settlement in international trade. *International Organization* 61(4): 735-761.

Rosendorff, B.P. and Milner, H.V. (2001). The optimal design of international trade institutions. *International Organization* 55(4): pp. 829-857.

Lecture 11: International environmental institutions (27.06.18)

REQ: Andresen, S., & Hey, E. (2005). The effectiveness and legitimacy of international environmental institutions. *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*, 5(3), 211-226.

Further reading:

Bernauer, T. (1995). The effect of international environmental institutions: how we might learn more. *International Organization*, 49(2), pp.351-377.

Parker, C.F., Karlsson, C. and Hjerpe, M. (2015). Climate change leaders and followers: Leadership recognition and selection in the UNFCCC negotiations. *International Relations*, 29(4), pp. 434-454.

Raustiala, K. (1997). States, NGOs and international environmental institutions. *International Studies Quarterly* 41: pp. 719-740.

Part VI: Implications and future of international organizations

Lecture 12: Implications and the future of international organizations (04.07.18)

REQ: Weiss, T. G. (2009). What happened to the idea of world government. *International studies quarterly*, 53(2), 253-271.

Further reading:

Craig, C. (2008). The resurgent idea of world government. *Ethics & International Affairs*, 22(2): pp. 133-142.

Luck, E. C. (2003). Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a history in progress. *International Relations Studies and the United Nations Occasional Papers*, 2003 No. 1.

Moravcsik, A. (2004). Is there a 'democratic deficit' in world politics? A framework for analysis. *Government and Opposition* 39(2): pp. 336-63.

Pevehouse, J.C. (2002). Democracy from the outside-in? International organizations and democratization. *International Organization* 56(3): pp. 515-549.

11.07.18: Final exam

General information

To help you study, I prepared guiding questions for all the required readings that you should keep in mind while doing your readings. For extra credit, you can upload your answers to the discussion board on the LearnWeb under the appropriate headings. Engaging with another person's post or answering another person's question will also be taken into consideration for extra credit.

All the readings mentioned in this syllabus have been uploaded to LearnWeb. The articles for further reading are especially useful if you are thinking about specializing in international relations (for a Master's, etc.) I would recommend that you download them even if you don't have time to read them all right now.

All lecture slides will be uploaded on the LearnWeb the day *after* the lecture.

Expectations

In my classroom, I have one main expectation: Respect. I respect you in your time, your interests, and your opinions, and you do the same for me and your colleagues. This includes that class will start and end on time; that we are attentive to each other during lectures and discussions; and that we respect each other's opinions, even if we don't agree.

You can use computers to take notes, but I reserve the right to confiscate it until the end of the class if I see you on social media or other non-class related sites. Same goes for cell phone use during class time.

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You are free to eat or drink during the class as long as it is not disruptive.

Your attendance at the simulation and the final exam are **mandatory** for course credit. However, if you have a very valid reason why you cannot attend these dates, please come to me and we will find another solution (valid reason: sickness or death in the family; non-valid reason: I have another paper due the same day.)